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1. Introduction 
Party autonomy has been described as the “cornerstone of the intersection between 
international commerce and private international law”. The idea behind this notion is that 
parties to an international dispute should be free to choose the law to govern the issues relating 
to the transaction, as well as to choose the forum to adjudicate over such disputes.1 Pre-
determination of forum provides for certainty and predictability, especially in cases where the 
parties have also chosen the law to be applied to the dispute.2 It should be noted that in most 
legal systems provision is made for both express or tacit choice of forum. The author will be 
dealing with the former. 
 
Where parties to an international commercial dispute have opted not to choose a forum, this 
could lead to undesirable results as the court approached could interpret the provisions of the 
contract in a way not intended by the parties. Consequently, there are two questions that arise:  
First, whether a court designated in a choice of court agreement may exercise jurisdiction over 
a matter where there exists no link between the dispute and the court, or between the parties 
and the court. Second, should a court which would otherwise have jurisdiction over the dispute 
before it, refuse to exercise jurisdiction in order to honour a choice of court agreement in favour 
of another court chosen by the parties?3    
 
Before the above questions can be answered, it is first necessary to ascertain whether or not the 
choice of forum clause in a contract is in fact enforceable. In order to determine such, generally 
speaking, the clause has to be both substantively and formally valid in terms of the applicable 
law. Where the agreement does not meet the substantive and formal requirements for its 
validity, the agreement may, depending on the content of the particular jurisdictional rules, be 
disregarded by the court and the appropriate court, determined by the private international law 
rules of the court approached, will exercise jurisdiction over the matter. This infers that party 
autonomy is not always absolute and it may face certain limitations.  
 
 
1 Walsh “The uses and abuses of party autonomy in international contracts” 2010 University of New Brunswick 
Law Journal 12. 
2 Zaphiriou “Choice of forum and choice of law clauses in international commercial agreements” 1978 
International Trade Law Journal 311. 
3 Gluck “Should there be choice of law and forum selection clauses in international contracts?” 1979 Public 
Contract Law Journal 103 114.  
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This paper contains a discussion on how the substantive and formal validity of international 
choice of court agreements can be determined in terms of the private international law rules of 
the European Union and in South Africa respectively. Particular attention will be had to the 
Brussels Convention,4 the Brussels I Regulation,5 the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements,6 and the Brussels 1bis Regulation.7 The paper will then focus on choice of court 
agreements in international civil and commercial cases in South Africa, and a comparison will 
be made between the legal position in the European Union and in South Africa in this regard. 
  
2. The European Union 
 
2.1 The Brussels Convention 
The Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (hereafter the Brussels Convention),8 is the predecessor of the Brussels I 
Regulation,9 and the current Brussels Ibis Regulation.10 This instrument is a public 
international law convention which was signed by the original six Member States of the 
European Community in 1968- Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands.11 Unlike the current EU Member States who are now bound by the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation,12 Denmark still remains a Contracting State to the Brussels Convention in respect 
of matters concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments.  
 
The Brussels Convention stipulates what the jurisdictional position is in cases where parties 
have not agreed on a forum,13 and provision is also made for parties to choose a forum to 
 
4 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, 1968 
5 Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of the Council of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L 12. 
6 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 2005. 
7 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(recast) [2012] OJ L 351. 
8 n 4 above. 
9 n 5 above. 
10 n 7 above. 
11 Reuland “The recognition of judgments in the European community: The twenty- fifth anniversary of the 
Brussels Convention” 1993 Michigan Journal of International Law 559 560.  
12 n 7 above. 
13 See n 4 above, articles 2-6 which sets out which law is applicable in cases where the defendant is domiciled in 
a Contracting State and where the defendant is not domiciled in a Contracting State.  
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adjudicate upon any disputes that may arise between them.14 The latter is relevant for present 
purposes and will be discussed below. 
 
Article 17 of the Brussels Convention deals with an express choice of forum by the parties and 
provides: 
“If the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Contracting State, have 
agreed that a court or the courts of a Contracting State are to have jurisdiction to 
settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a 
particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction. Such an agreement conferring jurisdiction shall be either: (a) in writing 
or evidenced in writing; or (b) in a form which accords with practices which the 
parties have established between themselves; or (c) in international trade or 
commerce, in a form which accords with a usage of which the parties are or ought 
to have been aware and which in such trade or commerce is widely known to, and 
regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular 
trade or commerce concerned. Where such an agreement is concluded by parties, 
none of whom is domiciled in a Contracting State, the courts of other Contracting 
States shall have no jurisdiction over their disputes unless the court or courts 
chosen have declined jurisdiction...”15   
  
As stated previously, in order for a choice of court agreement to be enforceable it has to be 
both formally and substantively valid. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Transporti 
Castelletti Spedizioni Internationali SpA v Hugo Trumpy SpA16 held that legal certainty 
regarding which court will have jurisdiction is achieved because of the strict conditions as to 
form provided for in article 17. This is because the purpose of that provision is to designate, 
clearly and precisely, a court in a Contracting State which will have exclusive jurisdiction over 
any dispute arising between the parties.17 The clause must therefore allow for the court to be 
able to easily determine which court has been chosen without any reference to the substance of 
the case and it must be assessed only in light of the issues which may arise in connection with 
the formal requirements set out in the provision.18  
 
14 See inter alia Report No. C59/1 on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters, 27 September 1968, p 36.  
15 n 4 above, art. 17. 
16 Case no. C- 159/57, ECJ, 16 mar 1999. 
17 Transporti Castelleti Spedizioni Internationali SpA v Hugo Trumpy SpA (n16) above, par. 48. 
18 Transporti Castelleti Spedizioni Internationali SpA v Hugo Trumpy SpA (n16) above, par. 49. 
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Article 17 clearly stipulates that a choice of court agreement must either be in writing, and if 
orally agreed upon, then such oral agreement must be evidenced in writing, or it may also be 
in a form which is in line with the practices that the parties have between themselves, or in a 
form that is well-known and customary in international trade. In addition to this, either both or 
one of the parties must be domiciled in a Contracting State and the court chosen must be in a 
Contracting State.19 If neither party is domiciled in a Contracting State then no other courts in 
Contracting States have jurisdiction over any disputes, unless the court approached declines to 
exercise jurisdiction.20 If these requirements are fulfilled, then the chosen court is deemed to 
have exclusive jurisdiction.21  
 
In addition to the above, there has to be a true consensus between the parties on the chosen 
court in order for the agreement to be substantively valid. A court will not readily rely on a 
written document that one of the parties claims is proof of an oral agreement.22 Whether this is 
dealt with exclusively with reference to article 17 or whether national law has to be applied in 
order to determine if there has been a consensus, is a question that has lingered amongst the 
judiciary and scholars over the years. In the case of Corek Maritime v Handelsveem BV23 the 
ECJ considered whether the words “have agreed” in article 17 should be interpreted in a way 
that requires for the choice of court clause to be formulated in such a way that the chosen court 
can be identified through the wording of the clause alone.24  The court noted that in the past it 
has been held that by making the validity of a jurisdiction clause subject to the existence of an 
agreement between the parties, article 17 imposes the duty of examining, first, whether the 
clause stipulating which court shall have jurisdiction was clearly and precisely demonstrated 
as the consensus between the parties, and second, that the purpose of the requirements as to 
form imposed by the article is to ensure that consensus between the parties is in fact 
established.25 The court noted further that if, however, the purpose of article 17 is to protect 
 
19 n 4 above, art. 17; see also art. 52 which provides that domicile is determined according to the internal law of 
the court approached. 
20 Corek Maritime v Handelsveem BV and Others case no. C-387/98, ECJ, 9 nov 2000, 3. 
21 n 4 above, art. 17. 
22 n 14 above, p. 37. 
23 Corek Maritime GmbH v Handelsveem BV (n20) above. 
24Corek Maritime GmbH v Handelsveem BV (n20) above, 10. 
25Corek Maritime GmbH v Handelsveem BV  (n20) above, 13; see also Estasis Salotti di Colzani Aimo e 
Gianmario Colzani s.n.c. v RÜWA Polstereimaschinen GmbH case no. 24-76, Bundesgerichtshof, 1976, par. 7 
where the court held that article 17 must be interpreted to mean that it must be applied in light of the effect of the 
choice of forum clause; that is, that both the general provision for jurisdiction in article 2 and the special 
jurisdictional clauses in articles 5 and 6 of the Convention must be excluded; see inter alia Galeries Segoura 
SPRL v Société Rahim Bonakdarian. case no. 25-76, Bundesgerichtshof, 1976, par. 6; and MSG v Gravières 
Rhénanes case no. C-106/95, ECJ, 20 feb 1997, par. 15.   
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the wishes of the parties concerned, then the article must be interpreted in a manner consistent 
with those wishes. This is so because article 17 recognises the free will of the parties to a 
contract in deciding which courts will have jurisdiction to settle disputes falling within the 
scope of the Convention.26   
 
It was therefore held that the words “have agreed” cannot be interpreted as meaning that it is 
necessary for a choice of court clause to be formulated in such a way that the competent court 
can be determined on its wording alone. The clause should merely state the objective factors 
on the basis of which the parties have agreed to choose a particular court or courts to which 
they wish to submit any disputes which may arise between them. These objective factors must 
be precise enough to allow the court seized to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, and 
they may also, where appropriate, be determined by the particular circumstances of the case.27 
It is therefore sufficient to hold that if the formal requirements for validity are met then there 
exists a consensus between the contracting parties.28 
 
2.2 Brussels I Regulation 
The Brussels I Regulation (hereafter the Regulation),29 was said to have transformed the 
Brussels Convention30 into a “community law instrument”.31 Unlike the Brussels Convention, 
the Regulation was automatically applicable for all EU Member States and did not have to be 
ratified. Much of the content remained the same as that in the Brussels Convention, however, 
there were some structural changes in the new text and matters regulated in the Protocol to the 
Brussels Convention were brought into the main text.32 
 
Article 23 of the Regulation deals with prorogation to jurisdiction as opposed to the previous 
article 17 of the Brussels Convention.33 There are three notable changes to the provisions 
relating to choice of court agreements. The first is that article 23(1) now provides that a choice 
of court clause does not necessarily confer exclusive jurisdiction on the chosen court. The 
 
26Corek Maritime GmbH v Handelsveem BV (n20) above, 14; see also Meeth v Glacetal case no. C 23/78, ECJ, 9 
nov 1978, par. 5. 
27 Corek Maritime GmbH v Handelsveem BV (n20) above, 15. 
28 Weller “Choice of forum agreements under the Brussels 1 Recast and under the Hague Convention: Coherences 
and clashes” 2016 Journal of Private International Law 1 9. 
29 n 5 above. 
30 n 4 above. 
31 Kennet “The Brussels 1 Regulation” 2001 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 725 725.  
32 Kennet (n 31) above, 726. 
33 see n 15 above. 
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provision specifically provides that the chosen court will have jurisdiction, and such 
jurisdiction will be exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise.34 Under the Brussels 
Convention, however, the chosen court has exclusive jurisdiction and no provision is made for 
the parties to agree that such jurisdiction will be non- exclusive.35 The second modification lies 
in sub-section (2) which makes provision for an electronic agreement between the parties. 
Where there exists a communication by electronic means which produces a durable record of 
the agreement, then such record is now deemed to satisfy the requirement of “in writing”.36 
Lastly, article 23 no longer includes any reference to agreements for the benefit of one of the 
parties. This could be because this provision now explicitly permits for non-exclusive choice 
or court agreements.37 
 
The requirements for the formal validity of a choice of forum clause under the Regulation are 
similar to those under the Brussels Convention. At least one of the parties to the agreement has 
to be domiciled in a Member State and the court chosen also has to be in a Member State. If 
neither one of the parties is domiciled in a member state then no other courts in Member States 
may exercise jurisdiction unless the chosen court declines jurisdiction.38 The agreement has to 
be in writing or evidenced in writing, this includes electronic communications which provide 
a durable record of the agreement. The agreement could also be done in a way which is in line 
with the practices of the parties, or in a way which is customary in the international trade 
community.39  
 
Unlike the formal validity of a choice of court clause, it is unclear as to the extent to which 
article 23 also regulates the substantive validity of such agreements which results in varying 
opinions on the matter.40 On the one hand, it is submitted that article 23 is a two-stage process 
where one has to determine, first, whether the formal requirements set out in the provision have 
been met, and second, if there is ‘an agreement’. The reasoning behind this is that the need to 
 
34 See n 5 above, art. 23(1). 
35 n 4 above, art. 17. 
36 See n 5 above, art. 23(2). 
37 Kennet (n 31) above, 731; see also n 8 above, art. 17 where it provides that, “if an agreement conferring 
jurisdiction was concluded for the benefit of only one of the parties, that party shall retain the right to bring 
proceedings in any other court which has jurisdiction by virtue of this Convention”. 
38 n 5 above, art. 23(3). 
39 n 5 above, art. 23; see inter alia Briggs The Conflict of Laws (2013) 50 76; and Kruger “The South African 
litigant and European Union rules of civil procedure” 2005 The Comparative and International Law Journal of 
Southern Africa 75 84-85. 
40 Merret “Article 23 of the Brussels 1 Regulation: A comprehensive code for jurisdiction agreements?” 2009 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 545 546. 
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show the existence of an agreement and the need to show compliance with formalities are two 
separate requirements, the former of which is to be determined by national law, namely, the 
proper law of the contract. The second reason is that if everything had to be determined with 
reference to the provisions of the article alone, there would be no room for courts to consider 
issues such as fraud and duress which would lead to a situation where the clauses could be 
considered valid despite them not constituting a real consensus between the parties.41 On the 
other hand, others argue that the provision simply envisages one question as to whether there 
exists an agreement which satisfies the formal requirements in the article. In this regard it is 
suggested that that the requirements of article 23 are both necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the enforceability of the choice of court clause and there is simply no need to consider 
national law or any additional community idea of 'consensus' not provided for in article 23.42  
 
The latter argument has been favoured in many European court judgments.43 The England and 
Wales High Court in Roche Products Ltd v Provimi Ltd44 referred to the Hugo Trumpy case 
above,45 and stated that in light of what the ECJ held about legal certainty and the strict formal 
requirements set out in article 17 of the Brussels Convention,46 it is clear that the material 
validity of a choice of forum clause has to be determined exclusively by reference to the 
provisions of article 23 of the Regulation. There must therefore be an agreement conferring 
jurisdiction on a particular court to settle any disputes which have arisen or which are likely to 
arise between the parties to the agreement.47 In respect of what constitutes “an agreement 
conferring jurisdiction”, the court held further that the phrase had an autonomous meaning and 
was not to be interpreted according to national laws. National laws could only be used to 
determine two particular questions in this regard. The first is whether the dispute in issue arose 
out the contract in which the choice of court clause is contained. The second question is whether 
the scope of the agreement included the dispute before the court.48  
 
 
41 Merret (n 40) above, 549. 
42 Merret (n 40) above, 550. 
43 Most cases in fact deal with article 17 of the Brussels Convention, the predecessor of the Brussels 1 Regulation. 
The underlying principles, however, remain the same.  
44 2003 2 All ER 683 (EWHC). 
45 Transporti Castelleti Spedizioni Internationali SpA v Hugo Trumpy SpA (n16) above. 
46 See n 16,17,18 above. 
47 Roche Products Ltd v Provimi Ltd (n44) above, par. 82. 
48 Roche Products Ltd v Provimi Ltd (n44) above, par. 83; see also Powell Duffryn plc v Wolfgang Petereit case 
no. C-214/89, ECJ, 10 mar 1992. 
10 
 
The above was summarised by Advocate General Lenz in Custom Made Commercial Limited 
v Stawa Metallbau2749 as follows: “The formal requirements set out in Article 17 do not have 
an aim in themselves, but perform the function of ensuring that the consensus between the 
parties is in fact established ...”50 
 
In light of the above, case law has clearly illustrated over the years that the formal requirements 
set out in article 23 are both necessary and sufficient conditions for a choice of court agreement 
to be substantively valid. In other words, if the requirements for formal validity are met, then 
the chosen court will have jurisdiction because the parties are deemed to have consensus. This 
is so because article 23 alone will determine if the clause is valid so long as the dispute is 
connected with the contract in which the clause is contained. 
 
2.3 The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (hereafter the HCCCA),51 has been 
described as “a tool for transaction planning and for subsequent dispute resolution, validating 
party autonomy through upholding choice of court agreements and enforcing judgments 
resulting from exclusive choice of court agreements...”.52 It is an international treaty to which 
the EU is a Member State, but which the EU has ratified with a reservation relating to insurance 
contracts as provided for in article 21.53  
 
Article 1 of the HCCCA states that the Convention applies to exclusive choice of court 
agreements in international civil or commercial cases.54 An “exclusive choice of court 
agreement” is defined in article 3 as:  
“an agreement concluded by two or more parties that meets the requirements of 
paragraph c) and designates, for the purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen 
or may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, the courts of one 
Contracting State or one or more specific courts of a Contracting State to the 
exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts.”55 
 
49 Case no. C-288/92, ECJ, 29 jun 1994. 
50 Custom Made Commercial Limited v Stawa Metallbau (n 49) above, opinion delivered 8 March 1994, par. 96. 
51 n 6 above. 
52 Winship and Teitz “Developments in private international law: Facilitating cross- border transactions and 
dispute resolution” 2005 The International Lawyer 505 507. 
53 See n 6 above, art. 21. 
54 n 6 above, art. 1; see also n 6 above, art. 3(b) which states that a choice of court agreement will be exclusive 
unless the parties have agreed otherwise. 
55 n 6 above, art. 3(a). 
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Just as under the Regulation,56 the HCCCA provides that a choice of court agreement will be 
exclusive, unless the parties have agreed otherwise.57 Unlike under the Brussels Convention 
and Regulation respectively, there exists no provision for such agreement to be concluded in a 
way that is normal practice between the parties, or that which is customary and well- known in 
international trade. The only formal requirements are that such agreement must be concluded 
in writing or by any other means of communication which renders such agreement accessible 
for subsequent reference.58 Furthermore, the choice of court agreement is treated as an 
independent agreement from the contract in which it is found. This therefore implies that the 
validity of the agreement cannot be contested solely on the ground that the underlying contract 
is invalid.59 This notion is similar to the South African doctrine of severability which allows for 
a void or uncertain clause to be removed from the underlying contract without the underlying 
contract being void and vice versa.60 
 
What makes an exclusive choice of court agreement under the HCCCA substantively valid, is 
not so clear. Earlier drafts of the convention and the Working Group discussions for the present 
Convention attempted to incorporate and harmonize substantive contract rules. This approach, 
however, proved to be unworkable and was abandoned in favour of resorting to national law in 
certain instances.61 The HCCCA therefore does not include an independent standard of 
substantive validity but incorporates a choice of law of the chosen court.62 This is clear from 
article 5(1) which provides that a chosen court in terms of an exclusive choice of court 
agreement shall have jurisdiction over the matter before it, unless the agreement is null and void 
under the law of that state.63 An extension of this is provided for in article 6 which states that a 
court of a Contracting State not chosen in terms of the choice of court agreement must suspend 
or dismiss proceedings arising under such agreement unless, the agreement is null and void 
under the law of the state of the chosen court; a party lacked the capacity to conclude the 
agreement in terms of the law of the state of the chosen court, and there was therefore no true 
 
56 n 5 above. 
57 n 6 above, art. 3(b). 
58 n 6 above, art. 3(c)(i) and (ii). 
59 n 6 above, art. 3(d). 
60 Ditedu The Doctrine of Separability in respect of the Arbitration Clause of a Contract: A Comparative Study 
of English Law and South African Law (2014 dissertation NWU) 45. 
61 Teitz “The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating party autonomy and providing an alternative to 
arbitration” 2005 The American Journal of Comparative Law 543 552. 
62 Teitz (n 61) above, 552, fn 41. 
63 n 6 above, art. 5(1). 
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consensus between the parties; or giving effect to the agreement would lead to a manifest 
injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the state of the chosen court.64  
 
It has therefore been said that the validity of an exclusive choice of forum clause can be assessed 
in three ways: 1. By the chosen court when it accepts jurisdiction; b) by the court not chosen 
when it must suspend or dismiss proceedings instituted contrary to the clause; and c) by the 
court approached when recognition of the judgment is sought. The HCCCA therefore indicates 
that the determination of the validity of the agreement is to be made under the law of the state 
of the court chosen, however, the non-chosen court and the enforcing court still have the 
possibility to invoke their public policy in some cases.65  
 
It has been argued whether or not the standard of review for the validity of the choice of court 
agreement is the same or different in the chosen court and in the court not chosen. It is obvious 
that the chosen court will have to examine fully the validity of the jurisdiction agreement. There 
is an opinion, however, that a court not chosen need not do a full examination, but rather a 
lesser or prima facie standard of review.66 Against this background it has been held that there 
exists no obligation under the HCCCA for the court not chosen to use a reduced standard of 
review for the nullity of the choice of court agreement in order to give priority to the chosen 
court. Priority is also not given to the court first seized. Rather, all courts in Contracting States 
operate on an equal footing. Each court is competent to decide for itself on the validity and 
scope of the jurisdiction agreement. The non-chosen court may, however, decide on its own to 
give priority to the chosen court by suspending its own proceedings, and it may also decide to 
continue its own proceedings and go into the merits if it finds that the jurisdiction agreement is 
null and void. It can therefore be concluded that to a certain extent the HCCCA’s co-ordination 
mechanism accepts parallel proceedings which it actually seeks to avoid but it is evident that 
there is no comprehensive harmonisation of all relevant issues, and even if there were 
comprehensive harmonisation on the level of the applicable law, divergent decisions on 
procedural grounds would still be a possibility.67   
 
 
64 n 6 above, art. 6(a)-(c). 
65 Teitz (n 61) above, 552. 
66 Weller (n 28) above, 20. 
67 Weller (n 28) above, 21. 
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On a different note, the question might arise as to which instrument to apply should more than 
one be applicable to a particular situation. For example, one may ask which instrument should 
be used in cases where there is a choice of court agreement between two or more parties and 
where both the new Brussels Ibis Regulation (which will be discussed below), and the HCCCA 
apply.68 This question is answered in article 26 of the HCCCA. In terms hereof, the Convention 
does not affect the application of the rules of a Regional Economic Integration Organisation, 
such as the EU, that is a party to this Convention, whether adopted before or after this 
Convention, where at least one of the parties is resident in a Contracting State, that is, a state in 
the Regional Economic Integration Organisation.69 Therefore, if one or both of the parties are 
resident in an EU Member State, the Brussels 1bis Regulation will apply. The Convention will 
only apply if one or both of the parties are resident in a Contracting State where such State is 
not an EU Member State.70 
 
2.4 The Brussels Ibis Regulation 
The Brussels Ibis Regulation (hereafter the Brussels I Recast),71 is a supranational instrument 
currently in force, to which EU Member States are bound, to the exclusion of Denmark who 
still uses the Brussels Convention.72 The Brussels I Recast is the successor of the previous 
Brussels I Regulation,73 and had its application from 2015.  It applies to civil and commercial 
matters to the exclusion of certain specified matters.74 
 
Where parties have entered into a choice of court agreement, the same requirements from article 
23 of the Brussels Regulation are seen in the Recast.75 Article 25 of the Recast makes provision 
for prorogation of jurisdiction and provides that a choice of court agreement must be either in 
writing or evidenced in writing. This includes any communication by electronic means which 
provides a durable record of the agreement; in a form established according to the practices of 
 
68 See Teitz (n 61) above, 549. 
69 n 6 above, art. 26(6)(a). 
70 Cleary Gottlieb “European Union approves Hague Convention on choice of Court Agreements” 
https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/organize-archive/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/european-union-approves-
hague-convention-on-choice-of-court-agreements.pdf (09/10/2019); see also van Loon “The 2005 Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements- An introduction” 2016 Anali Pravnog Fakulteta Univerziteta U 
Zenici 11 16. 
71 n 7 above. 
72 n 4 above. 
73 n 5 above. 
74 n 7 above, art. 1(1); see also sub-section (2)(a)-(f) which provides for the exclusions from the scope of the 
Recast. 
75 Melamu The Role of Express Submission to Jurisdiction Under the Brussels 1 Regulation, Brussels 1 (Recast) 
and the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (2015 dissertation UJ) 16. 
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the parties; or in a form which accords with the usage that is usual or customary in international 
trade or commerce.76 Furthermore, a choice of court agreement is exclusive “unless the parties 
have agreed otherwise”.77 The provision also provides that a choice of court agreement is 
independent from the underlying contract and consequently a party is unable to contest the 
validity of the jurisdiction agreement solely on the basis that the underlying contract is invalid.78 
The purpose of these formal requirements is to ensure that the parties actually reached an 
agreement and to prevent one of the parties bound by it from ignoring the agreement.79  
 
Article 25 of the Recast, however, contains notable differences compared to article 23 of the 
Regulation. First, article 25 stipulates that the domicile of the parties to the choice of court 
agreement is irrelevant where the parties have agreed that a court or courts in a particular 
Member State will have jurisdiction.80 This is different from the position under both the 
Brussels Convention and the Brussels Regulation where at least one of the parties has to be 
domiciled in a member state. The Recast therefore does away with the need for an enquiry into 
the domicile of the parties.81 There has, however, been some criticism in this regard where it is 
argued that the Recast only focuses on regulating relationships with Member-State courts and 
in so doing, it fails to create new relationships between member state and non- Member State 
courts. The right of parties to designate a court under the Recast, therefore, still rests on whether 
or not the chosen court is in a Member State. It has been suggested that in order to achieve a 
greater level of legal certainty, the ambit of the Recast should have been extended to include 
choice of court agreements in favour of non-Member State courts.82 The author disagrees with 
this point of criticism. The HCCCA already achieves the goal of international harmony and 
legal certainty for its Contracting States. The Recast was intended for the harmonisation of laws 
 
76 n 7 above, art. 25(1)(a)-(c) and (2). 
77 See Keyes and Marshall “Jurisdiction agreements: exclusive, optional and asymmetrical” 2015 Journal of 
Private International Law 345 352 where it states that the Recast does not define exclusivity. Although the Recast 
refers to the courts of a single Member State, the ECJ in Meeth v Glacetal case no.23/78, ECJ, 9 nov 1978, held 
that a jurisdiction agreement was exclusive under the Brussels Convention if it excluded the jurisdiction of all 
other competent Member State courts. The same should be held under the Recast. Therefore, any agreement that 
does not exclude the jurisdiction of all but the single chosen jurisdiction for each party should be regarded as non-
exclusive under the Recast even though the parties may have characterised it as “exclusive”. 
78 n 7 above, art. 25(5); see also van Calster European Private International Law (2012) 19 123 where it states 
that the section merely contains the word ‘agreement’ which implies that one has to assess the substance and not 
merely the formality of a jurisdiction agreement. 
79 Briggs Private International Law in English Courts (2014) 168 246-248. 
80 n 7 above, art. 25(1). 
81 Melamu (n 75) above. 
82 Melamu (n 75) above. 
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within the EU and it seems to be illogical to apply the Recast in cases where neither the parties 
to the dispute, nor the chosen court, are in an EU Member State. 
 
The second amendment found in article 25 of the Recast is the introduction of a harmonised 
conflict of law rule to govern the substantive validity of the choice of forum agreement. The 
applicable law prescribed is the law of the chosen forum. The provision states that the chosen 
court in terms of a jurisdiction agreement shall have jurisdiction unless such agreement is null 
and void as to its substantive validity in terms of the law of the state of that court.83 Recital 20 
provides that the law of the state of the chosen court includes its private international law rules 
so that there is little to no possibility of having unpredictable and varying decisions across the 
Member States.84 The application of this part of the provision was recently seen in the case of 
Happy Flights v Ryanair where the Belgian Court of Cassation considered the validity a choice 
of court clause in favour of an Irish court. The court was critical of the decision of the 
Commercial Court of Brussels by stating that the Commercial Court only considered the formal 
validity of the clause and the substantive validity thereof was disregarded. The court then 
referred to article 25(1) of the Brussels I Recast which specifically holds that the substantive 
validity of a choice of forum clause is to be determined by the law of the chosen court.85 In 
casu, the chosen court was an Irish court and therefore Irish law was to be applied to determine 
the substantive validity of the choice of court clause. 
 
It is unclear whether in copying the choice of law rule from the HCCCA into recital 20 of the 
Recast, the former nexus between form and a true consensus that existed under the Brussels 
Convention, was also to be changed. On the one hand, if the Recast followed the HCCCA, the 
nexus between form and consent would be altered drastically as any formal requirements would 
no longer have to be applied restrictively due to the fact that form would no longer indicate 
consent. Consequently, an independent test or standard for consent would probably no longer 
exist. On the other hand, one may argue that such a drastic and fundamental change should have 
been made explicit and in the absence of such, one should adhere to the previous nexus between 
form and consent. It has therefore been suggested that the choice of a transnational non-State 
 
83 Cook “Pragmatism in the European Union: Recasting the Brussels 1 Regulation to ensure the effectiveness of 
exclusive choice of court agreements” 2013 Aberdeen Law Review 86 94-95. 
84 n 7 above, recital 20, which provides that if a question arises as to whether a choice of court agreement in favour 
of a Member State is null and void as to its substantive validity, the law of the Member State of the chosen should 
be applied and this includes the state’s conflict of law rules. 
85 Kruger “Belgian Court of Cassation and Ryanair’s forum clauses” (http://conflictoflaws.net/2019/belgian-
court-of-cassation-and-ryanairs-forum-clauses/ (09-07-2019)). 
16 
 
law for determining whether there is an “agreement” and how it should be interpreted is 
preferable since it greatly simplifies the jurisdictional phase of the proceedings and makes it 
independent from a State’s national law.86 The author is of the opinion that the Recast clearly 
states that the substantive validity of the forum clause depends on the law of the chosen State 
and a separate standard or test as to form exists in the provision itself. It can therefore be 
concluded that form does not indicate consensus and the nexus that existed under the Brussels 
Convention appears to have changed under the Recast.   
 
3. South Africa 
In South Africa parties are free to incorporate a choice of forum clause into their underlying 
contract stipulating which court will have jurisdiction to adjudicate over any issues arising out 
of the underlying contract.87 Unlike the position in the EU, however, the rules regarding the 
substantive and formal validity of international choice of court agreements are not always as 
clear-cut in South Africa and the sources are rather scarce.  
 
Provision is found for jurisdiction clauses in favour of lower courts, but the position is less clear 
where such clauses are entered into in favour of a higher court. For example, the Magistrates’ 
Court Act88 provides for jurisdiction by consent of the parties to a regional or district division 
of a Magistrate’s Court which would otherwise not have jurisdiction over the matter. Such 
consent must be in writing and is subject to the condition that,89 “[a] court of a civil division 
shall have no jurisdiction in matters in which (a) the dissolution of a marriage is sought; and 
(b) the validity or interpretation of a will or other testamentary document is in question.”90 
 
A cause for confusion does however exist as it has been suggested that consent in writing does 
not necessarily amount to an agreement.91 What this means exactly is unclear but a possible 
explanation could be that evidence of written consent between the parties does not necessarily 
mean that there was in fact a consensus between the parties. An example of this would be cases 
involving duress or fraud. Another caveat to take note of is that the section prohibits pre-emptive 
consent to jurisdiction. “Pre-emptive” consent refers to consent that is given prior to any 
 
86 Weller (n 28) above, 10. 
87 van Niekerk and Schulze The South African Law of International Trade: Selected Topics (2016) 302 315. 
88 32 of 1994. 
89 n 88 above, s45; see inter alia Hutchison et al The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 395 413. 
90 n 88 above, s46A. 
91 Spiro “Jurisdiction by consent” 1967 SALJ 295 297. 
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proceedings having been initiated or which are about to be initiated.  In other words, the consent 
to jurisdiction can only be given once proceedings are imminent.92 Furthermore, Forsyth has 
expressed that our legislation presents the impossibility of a peregrinus suing another peregrinus 
in South Africa unless they have some other association with the jurisdiction other than their 
choice of forum agreement.93 This is because the principle of “submission” is considered to be 
an extension of the existing jurisdiction of a court and not a tool for creating jurisdiction that 
would otherwise be absent.94 This goes to show that in certain cases a choice of court agreement 
is insufficient on its own to confer jurisdiction on a court. At common law, however, this is not 
a requirement as the presence of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement will be enough to confer 
jurisdiction.95 
 
As stated previously, the position in cases of consent to jurisdiction of higher courts is not as 
clear. Moreover, the subject matter of international choice of court agreements has not been 
extensively analysed in a South African context. Schulze states that under South African law, as 
a general rule, in order for an agreement submitting to the jurisdiction of a foreign court to be 
effective, it must be express and cannot be implied.96 Roodt has stated further that ordinary 
conflicts rules govern the formation, validity and effect of choice of court agreements, however, 
these agreements have not given rise to wide litigation in South Africa.97 This could be a valid 
reason for the somewhat lack of clarity in this area of discussion.  
 
In addition to the above, choice of court agreements have been described as “adjunct to party 
autonomy”.98 It appears as though they are simply seen as, for lack of a better word, ancillary to 
choice of law clauses, the latter of which seems to be a popular topic for discussion. A possible 
 
92 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services; Association of Debt 
Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic; Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd v University 
of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic 2016 6 SA 596 (CC), par. 112. 
93 See Cilliers, Loots and Nel Herbstein and van Winsen: The Civil Practice of the High Courts of South Africa 
(2009) 42 65 where it states that if a court has no jurisdiction to hear a particular matter then neither acquiescence 
nor express consent will confer jurisdiction; see also Moran and Kennedy Commercial Litigation in Anglophone 
Africa (2018) 349 428 and 431 which provides that the mere submission to jurisdiction by a foreign peregrinus  
defendant is not enough to confer jurisdiction; and Veneta Mineraria Spa v Carolina Collieries (Pty) Ltd 1987 4 
SA 883 (A).  
94 Pistorius Pollak on Jurisdiction (1993) 1 8. 
95 Oppong “Private international law in Africa: The past, present and future” 2007 The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 677 711.    
96 Schulze “The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements” 2007 SA Merc. LJ 140 147.  
97 Roodt “Jurisdiction of the South African Labour Court: Employer identity and party autonomy” 2003 SA Merc. 
LJ 135 147; see also Roodt and Esser “Venue in transnational litigation: Party autonomy adds new impetus to the 
‘Judgment Project’” 2006 SA Merc. LJ 13 29 where it is stipulated that, “in terms of South African law, the proper 
law of a contract governs the validity of a submission clause contained in it”. 
98 Roodt and Esser (n97) above, 24. 
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reason for this is that one has to determine which is the governing law of the contract before one 
can decide whether or not the contract and the clauses contained therein are in fact valid. 
Moreover, the applicable law is often the law of the chosen court. The two therefore seem to go 
hand- in- hand.99  
 
Attention has been given to whether or not a South African court will recognise a choice of court 
clause in favour of a foreign court. In this regard the Supreme Court of Appeal has held that 
despite the existence of a choice of court clause and the fact that the parties have freedom to 
contract, one cannot exclude the jurisdiction of a particular court or courts.100 Therefore,  
although the parties can agree on the jurisdiction of a particular court and on the applicable law 
which they wish to govern the agreement exclusively, the South African courts still retain a 
discretion whether or not to exercise jurisdiction over a particular matter based on certain 
considerations and where there is some jurisdictional link to the South African courts.101 In light 
of this decision it can be concluded that choice of court agreements are in fact regarded as non- 
exclusive in a South African context. This is dissimilar to the default position in the EU which 
deems choice of court agreements to be exclusive.102 
 
It should also be noted that much confusion could arise in a South African context owing to the 
fact that provision is made for unilateral as well as bilateral express and tacit choice of court 
agreements. Although EU law does permit a tacit choice of forum between the parties, the idea 
of unilateral consent thereto does not exist in an EU context. The term “submission to 
jurisdiction” is in fact commonly used as what appears to be an umbrella term for all possible 
consent to a court’s jurisdiction.103 The question that could then arise is whether or not a unilateral 
submission can in fact amount to “an agreement” between the parties if only one of the parties 
actually makes the submission. Conversely, perhaps this could be considered to be a tacit 
 
99 See Inter alia Bell Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation (2003) 5.23; de Villiers “Limitations 
on party autonomy in the context of cross-border consumer contracts: The South African position” 2013 TSAR 
478 480; and Barnard Jurisdiction in International Civil and Commercial Cases: A Comparative Study of the Law 
in the IBSA Countries and the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (2014 dissertation UJ) 33-34.     
100 Foize Africa (Pty) Ltd v Foize Beheer BV  2012 4 All SA 387 (SCA), par. 21; see inter alia Without Prejudice 
(12-2012) 22. 
101 Foize Africa (Pty) Ltd v Foize Beheer BV (n 100) above, par. 21. 
102 See n 4 above, art. 17 where it states that a choice of court agreement is deemed to be exclusive. See also n 5 
above, art. 23, n 6 above, art. 3(b), and n 7 above, art. 25 which provide that an choice of court agreement will be 
exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise.  
103 See Pistorius (n 94) above, 7, where Mediterranean Shipping Co v Speedwell Shipping Co Ltd 1986 4 SA 329 
(D) is referred to. It was held in this case that “submission to the jurisdiction of a court is a wide concept and may 
be expressed in words or come about by agreement between the parties”. It may also constitute a unilateral positive 
act or omission. 
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submission between both parties as in the EU.104 This actually goes against Schulze’s view above 
that a submission to jurisdiction has to be express and cannot be tacit. The main focus of the 
present discussion has been on express jurisdiction agreements made between both parties and 
not by one party alone. Many sources also seem to deal with unilateral submissions which has 
made this topic all the more challenging.105  
 
Perhaps our private international law rules relating to sales contracts could shed some light on 
this topic. In respect of formal validity, the lex loci contractus used to be the universally preferred 
governing law as it was essential for the parties entering into a contract to observe the local 
formalities for the conclusion thereof. Nowadays, however, there is no evidence to show that 
observance of the local law is compulsory and it has therefore been suggested that observance of 
the proper law is also sufficient.106 This view was supported by the Appellate Division in Ex 
Parte Spinazze107 where it was stated in an obiter dictum that:  
“...modern South African law should adopt a facultative approach to the well- 
entrenched rule that an antenuptial contract executed in accordance with the forms 
required by the lex loci contractus is formally valid, and... that a contract which 
alternatively complies as to form with the lex causae, or proper law, is formally 
valid, even though it may not comply with the formal requirements of the lex loci 
contractus.”108 
 
 
104 See Roodt (n 97) above, 147, where the question is posed as to whether a choice of domicilium citandi et 
executandi can be considered a valid choice of court agreement. Debates have also frequently taken place 
elsewhere as to whether a choice of law can amount to a tacit choice of court and vice versa. 
105 See Forsyth Private International Law (2012) 167 217-234; Cilliers, Loots and Nel (n 93) above, 64-66; 
Theophilopoulos, van Heerden and Boraine Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure (2015) 61 77- 79; van 
Niekerk and Schulze (n 87) above, 315-320; Kelbrick “The doctrine of consent” 1986 CILSA 130- 136; Schulze 
“Private international law and jurisdictional problems relating to offshore joint venture agreements” 1985 CILSA 
383 399-400; Jones “Courts’ jurisdiction” 2006 De Rebus 26-27; Viejobueno “Private international law rules 
relating to the validity of international sales contracts” 1993 CILSA 172-210; Forsyth “The impact of the domestic 
on the international: Some crucial deficiencies in the South African Law of Jurisdiction with their regional and 
international consequences” 2006 SA Merc. LJ 1 3-7; Veneta Mineraria Spa v Carolina Collieries 1987 2 All SA 
447 (A), par. 41; Travelex Limited v Maloney 2016 ZASCA 218, par. 17-18; American Flag plc v Great African 
T-shirt Corporation 2000 1 SA 356 (W); and Hay Management Consultations Ltd v P3 Management 
Consultations (Pty) Ltd 2005 2 SA 522 (SCA), all of which deal submission to jurisdiction. 
106 Viejobueno (n 105) above, 208. 
107 1985 3 SA 650 (A). 
108 n 107 above, p 318; cf Creutzburg v Commercial Bank of Namibia Ltd 2006 4 All SA 327 (SCA), par. 10 where 
the court stated that “ if a contract is formally valid in terms of the lex loci contractus one need look no further. 
The facultative approach was intended to ensure that a contract was not rendered invalid merely for lack of the 
forms required by the lex loci contractus when it complied as to form with its proper law. 
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In determining the substantive validity of a sales contract, the proper law of the contract is to be 
applied subject to certain exceptions.109 When the contractual capacity of one or more of the parties 
is in question, some old Roman-Dutch authorities suggested that a choice existed between the lex 
domicili and the lex loci contractus. The matter has not been settled conclusively in South African 
case law.110 Similarly, it has been suggested that the lex loci solutionis governs the legality of the 
performances stipulated in the contract.111     
 
In light of the above it seems as though our courts haven’t had to deal extensively with issues 
relating to the validity of international choice of court agreements. If they had then surely there 
would be more information at our disposal and not so much uncertainty. It is therefore suggested 
that our law be developed in this regard to be on par with other private international law rules 
regarding jurisdiction, thus decreasing the uncertainty and increasing international harmony of 
jurisdictional rules. A further possibility is that perhaps we haven’t encountered as many issues 
due to the fact that our rules are sufficient enough therefore doing away with the need to provide 
more concrete rules in this regard. After all, our law is reactive in nature in that it only develops 
after the cause giving rise to the need for change emerges. This leads to the next point of 
discussion. 
 
4. Ratification of the HCCCA by South Africa 
A popular topic of debate concerns the consequences of South Africa ratifying the HCCCA. 
South Africa joined the Hague Conference on Private International Law in 2002, becoming the 
59th Member State, but it is yet to ratify the Convention.112 Some argue that harmonising 
substantive law across jurisdictions would not do well for private international law, however, not 
only is it extremely unlikely for this to occur fully within our lifetime, but such claims wrongly 
assume that private international law is all about choice of law. Jurisdictional issues will still be 
relevant since factors other than the applicable law usually determine the parties’ choice of 
forum. Harmonization of law promotes certainty because it subjects cross-border transactions to 
the same, or similar, substantive law which leads to equal legal treatment and potentially reducing 
transaction costs. Harmonization further provides an avenue for social integration, and can be an 
 
109 Viejobueno (n 105) above, 200. 
110 Viejobueno (n 105) above, 204; see, in general, Fredericks Contractual Capacity in Private International Law 
(2016 thesis University of Leiden). 
111 See Viejobueno (n 105) above, 207, where reference is made to South African case law supporting this 
conclusion. 
112 Forsyth (n 105 (2006)) above, 7. 
21 
 
important accessory to political and economic integration. People living under a harmonized 
system of law will therefore feel more interconnected.113  
 
It has been suggested that should South Africa ratify the HCCCA, both South Africa’s 
international as well as domestic jurisdiction will be affected, the latter of which bearing the most 
impact. The provision which would bring this effect about is article 5, which provides as follows: 
“1 The court or courts of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of 
court agreement shall have jurisdiction to decide a dispute to which the agreement 
applies, unless the agreement is null and void under the law of that State. ‘2 A court 
that has jurisdiction under paragraph 1 shall not decline to exercise jurisdiction on 
the ground that the dispute should be decided in a court of another State.”114  
 
The incorporation of the Convention into South African law would lead to the abandonment of 
the restrictive approach to submission in the matters which fall within the scope of the 
Convention. It would also result in the courts allowing peregrines to sue other peregrines in 
South Africa if the respondent has validly submitted to the jurisdiction of the South African 
courts, regardless of whether or not there exits an additional connecting factor to the chosen court 
which is currently required.115  
 
In addition to the above, questions concerning tacit submission or submission by conduct would 
still exist as the Convention deals only with choice of court agreements that cannot be unilaterally 
entered into. Moreover, in terms of South African law, the proper law of a contract governs the 
validity of a submission clause whereas under the Convention, the validity of the clause depends 
on the law of the chosen court (the lex fori).116 The latter appears to represent a tacit choice of 
law rule in that if a particular court is chosen then by virtue of such an agreement the law of that 
court applies.117  
 
Furthermore, the fact that the Convention applies solely to choice of court agreements makes the 
scope for its application limited in the sense that many cases involving no choice of court 
agreement will be subject to the particular country’s private international law rules. It has been 
 
113 Oppong (n 95) above, 712. 
114 Forsyth (n 105 (2006)) above, 8. 
115 Forsyth (n 105 (2006)) above, 8-9; see also Oppong (n 95) above. 
116 See n 6 above, art. 5(1) which states that a chosen court will have jurisdiction unless the agreement is null and 
void under the law of that state. 
117 Roodt and Esser (n 97) above, 29-30. 
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suggested that international law instruments should provide a mechanism in cases where there 
exists no choice of court agreement and the Convention’s failure in this regard will inevitably 
lead to a wide array of unpredictable and varying outcomes.118 Although the author understands 
the reasoning of this argument, she has a different opinion. The Convention was indeed created 
solely for choice of court agreements and that is precisely the point. In cases where a lengthy 
instrument which deals with a variety of matters is used, unnecessary confusion and uncertainty 
is created as to what may or may not be applicable. If the instrument provides for one particular 
matter only, then the rules relating to such are simplified, more easily accessible, and the possible 
complications lessened, leading to more certainty. As a result, there is a greater potential for the 
Convention’s adoption.    
 
In spite of the above noteworthy concerns, there also exists more favourable outcomes. First, the 
Convention will cover many cases that may currently not be included or provided for in terms of 
South African private international law. A role for the common law will therefore remain, unless 
it is decided to reform the law more generally. 
 
Furthermore, if South Africa were to ratify the Convention, not only would the jurisdictional 
rules in international cases relating to choice of court agreements be in harmony with the private 
international laws of the EU, but even more importantly, the rules will also be in harmony with 
those cases taking place in other Contracting States to the Convention. In line with this, the 
consequence of not only having a valid exclusive choice of court agreement in itself, but also one 
which is valid in terms of the laws of different jurisdictions is that any judgment given by the 
designated court will be recognized and enforced in all other Contracting States, thus giving 
effect to the outcomes intended by the parties in terms of their choice of court agreement.119  This 
will not only facilitate international trade but it also minimises the possibility of conflicting 
decisions, increases the possibility of global recognition and enforcement, and creates a much 
larger degree of certainty and predictability for both the parties and the courts.120 
 
In summary, the international harmonisation of the South African rules relating to international 
choice of court agreements has its challenges as well as its advantages. These need to be weighed 
 
118 Khatri The Effectiveness of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements in Making International 
Cross- Border Litigation Easier- A Critical Analysis (2016 dissertation Victoria University of Wellington) 11. 
119 Forsyth (n 105 (2006)) above, 10. 
120 See Khatri (n 118) above, 10- 11. 
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up against each other in order to determine if an attempt at this would be worth-while. In the 
opinion of the author, the international harmonisation of these rules, or perhaps an attempt at 
such, could lead to more advantages than disadvantages, or at the very least, advantages which 
would outweigh their challenges. It need not necessarily entail that South Africa ratify the 
Convention, but it is suggested that our law change in order to conform to the private international 
law rules of other regions which could entail, for example, using the Convention as a guideline. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
It is no secret that over the years legislative bodies in the EU have made numerous attempts, and 
have largely succeeded, in developing the private international law rules in that region. 
Specifically, the law relating to the substantive and formal validity of international choice of 
court agreements has changed over the years in such a way that allows for more scope of their 
application and of course, specific rules detailing the manner in which to apply these rules. This 
evolution has seen more predictability in the outcome of disputes as a result of the harmonized 
adoption and application of the rules in this region, leaving less room for error and uncertainty.  
 
It is not denied that there still exists a level of uncertainty in EU law regarding whether the 
establishment of a true consensus between the parties on a chosen court is to be determined 
according to the wording of the relevant provisions alone,121 or if reference should be made to 
national law. It can, however, be concluded with much certainty in light of EU case law that the 
application of national law to the validity of choice of court agreements should be avoided unless 
the subject-matter for determination is whether or not the dispute before the court is one relating 
to the contract in which the choice of court clause is contained.122 In addition to this, parties to a 
contract stipulating that a court in the EU has jurisdiction may, in certain circumstances, apply 
the HCCCA and not just to the Brussels Ibis Regulation.123 This broadens the scope of access to 
courts for parties and provides for greater clarity. 
 
The same, however, cannot be said in a South African context. Although our law has undergone 
incredible changes since our new Constitutional dispensation, it seems as though our private 
international law rules, particularly those relating to choice of court agreements, have been 
largely unexplored. The lack of interest in this area could possibly be attributed to the fact that 
 
121 Specifically article 17 of the Brussels Convention and article 25 of the Brussels 1 Recast. 
122 See inter alia Roche Products Ltd v Provimi Ltd (n 44) above. 
123 See n 6 above, art. 26.  
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because our courts haven’t really to had decide on this particular issue, there is no real reason to 
change our law. It is true that our law is reactive in nature in that it can only change when the 
need for such arises. If there is no need then there seems to be no reason to change. However, as 
we are entering into the fourth industrial revolution with the increase of globalization, it is only 
natural that we try and adapt to the internationally widely accepted laws dealing with 
international jurisdiction agreements. The crux of this lies in the fact that international 
commercial contracts are concluded across borders and between nationals and domiciliaries of 
different states. If the laws are not harmonized then the outcome of the various disputes will 
never be consistent- this is presumably the reason for the current obscurity in the South African 
rules on choice of court agreements. This could lead to undesirable and unintended results for 
the parties involved. In an attempt to avoid this, discussions should be held on how to better our 
laws relating to international choice of court agreements in order to facilitate international trade 
and international litigation. One way to do this would be to ratify the HCCCA which in turn 
would allow for a more harmonized and straightforward approach in dealing with choice of court 
agreements in international cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
          word count: 9 143 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
Bibliography 
 
Books 
1. Bell A Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation Oxford University Press 
Oxford (2003). 
2. Briggs A Private International Law in English Courts Oxford University Press Oxford 
(2014). 
3. Briggs A The Conflict of Laws Oxford University Press Oxford (2013). 
4. Forsyth CF Private International Law Juta Cape Town (2012). 
5. Cilliers AC, Loots C and Nel HC Herbstein  and Van Winsen: The Civil Practice of the High 
Courts of South Africa Juta Cape Town (2009). 
6. Hutchison D et al The Law of Contract in South Africa Oxford University Press Cape Town 
(2012). 
7. Moran AJ and Kennedy AJ Commercial Litigation in Anglophone Africa Juta Cape Town 
(2018).  
8. Pistorius D Pollak on Jurisdiction Juta Cape Town (1993). 
9. Theophilopoulos C, van Heerden CM, and Boraine A Fundamental Principles of Civil 
Procedure Lexisnexis Johannesburg (2015). 
10. Van Calster G European Private International Law Hart Publishing Oxford (2012). 
11. Van Niekerk JP and Schulze WG The South African Law of International Trade: Selected 
Topics SAGA Legal Publication Pretoria (2016).  
 
Dissertations and theses 
12. Barnard AP Jurisdiction in International Civil and Commercial Cases: A Comparative Study 
of the Law in the IBSA Countries and the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
(2014 dissertation UJ). 
13. Ditedu AL The Doctrine of Separability in respect of the Arbitration Clause of a Contract: 
A Comparative Study of English Law and South African Law (2014 dissertation NWU). 
14. Fredericks EA Contractual Capacity in Private International Law (2016 thesis University 
of Leiden). 
15. Khatri B The Effectiveness of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements in 
Making International Cross- Border Litigation Easier- A Critical Analysis (2016 
dissertation Victoria University of Wellington). 
26 
 
16. Melamu SD The Role of Express Submission to Jurisdiction Under the Brussels 1 
Regulation, Brussels 1 (Recast) and the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
(2015 dissertation UJ). 
 
EU instruments 
17. Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of the Council of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L 12.   
18. Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters (recast) [2012] OJ L 351. 
 
Foreign case law 
19. Corek Maritime v Handelsveem BV case no. C-387/98, ECJ, 9 Nov 2000. 
20. Custom Made Commercial Limited v Stawa Metallbau27 case no. C-288/92, ECJ, 29 Jun 
1994. 
21. Estasis Salotti di Colzani Aimo e Gianmario Colzani s.n.c. v RÜWA Polstereimaschinen 
GmbH case no. 24-76, Bundesgerichtshof, 1976. 
22. Galeries Segoura SPRL v Société Rahim Bonakdarian. case no. 25-76, Bundesgerichtshof, 
1976. 
23. Meeth v Glacetal case no. C 23/78, ECJ, 9 Nov 1978. 
24. MSG v Gravières Rhénanes case no. C-106/95, ECJ, 20 Feb 1997. 
25. Powell Duffryn plc v Wolfgang Petereit case no. C-214/89, ECJ, 10 Mar 1992. 
26. Roche Products Ltd v Provimi Ltd 2003 2 All ER 683 (EWHC). 
27. Transporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internationali SpA v Hugo Trumpy SpA Case no. C- 159/57, 
ECJ, 16 Mar 1999. 
 
International and regional conventions 
28. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, 1968. 
29. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 2005. 
 
Internet sources 
30. Cleary Gottlieb “European Union approves Hague Convention on choice of Court 
Agreements” (https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/organizearchive/cgsh/files/publicati 
27 
 
on-pdfs/european-union-approves-hague-convention-on-choice-of-court-agreements.pdf 
(09/10/2019)). 
31. Kruger T “Belgian Court of Cassation and Ryanair’s forum clauses” 
(http://conflictoflaws.net/2019/belgian-court-of-cassation-and-ryanairs-forum-clauses/ (09-
07-2019)). 
 
Journal articles 
32. Cook JP “Pragmatism in the European Union: Recasting the Brussels 1 Regulation to ensure 
the effectiveness of exclusive choice of court agreements” 2013 Aberdeen Law Review 86 
102. 
33. De Villiers MRH “Limitations on party autonomy in the context of cross-border consumer 
contracts: The South African position” 2013 TSAR 478 490. 
34. Forsyth CF “The impact of the domestic on the international: Some crucial deficiencies in 
the South African Law of Jurisdiction with their regional and international consequences” 
2006 SA Merc LJ 1 12. 
35. Gluck RD “Should there be choice of law and forum selection clauses in international 
contracts?” 1979 Public Contract Law Journal 103 129. 
36. Jones T “Courts’ jurisdiction” 2006 De Rebus 26 28. 
37. Kelbrick RA “The doctrine of consent” 1986 CILSA 130 136. 
38. Kennet W “The Brussels 1 Regulation” 2001 The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 725 737. 
39. Keyes M and Marshall BA “Jurisdiction agreements: exclusive, optional and asymmetrical” 
2015 Journal of Private International Law 345 378. 
40.  Kruger T “The South African litigant and European Union rules of civil procedure” 2005 
The Comparative and international Law Journal of Southern Africa 75 98. 
41. Merret L “Article 23 of the Brussels 1 Regulation: A comprehensive code for jurisdiction 
agreements?” 2009 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 545 564. 
42. Oppong RF “Private international law in Africa: The past, present and future” 2007 The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 677 719. 
43. Roodt C “Jurisdiction of the South African Labour Court: Employer identity and party 
autonomy” 2003 SA Merc. LJ 135 149.  
44. Roodt C and Esser IM “Venue in transnational litigation: Party autonomy adds new impetus 
to the ‘Judgment Project’” 2006 SA Merc. LJ 13 30. 
28 
 
45. Reuland RC “The recognition of judgments in the European community: The twenty- fifth 
anniversary of the Brussels Convention” 1993 Michigan Journal of International Law 
559 619. 
46. Schulze C “Private international law and jurisdictional problems relating to offshore joint 
venture agreements” 1985 CILSA 383 406. 
47. Schulze C “The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements” 2007 SA Merc. 
LJ 140 150. 
48. Spiro E “Jurisdiction by consent” 1967 SALJ 295 307. 
49. Teitz LE “The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating party autonomy and 
providing an alternative to arbitration” 2005 The American Journal of Comparative Law 
543 558. 
50. Van Loon “The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements- An introduction” 
2016 Anali Pravnog Fakulteta Univerziteta U Zenici 11 27. 
51. Viejobueno S “Private international law rules relating to the validity of international sales 
contracts” 1993 CILSA 172 210. 
52. Walsh C “The uses and abuses of party autonomy in international contracts” 2010 University 
of New Brunswick Law Journal 12 31. 
53. Weller M “Choice of forum agreements under the Brussels 1 Recast and under the Hague 
Convention: Coherences and clashes” 2016 Journal of Private International Law 1 37. 
54. Winship P and Teitz LE “Developments in private international law: Facilitating cross- 
border transactions and dispute resolution” 2005 The International Lawyer 505 513. 
55. Zaphiriou GA “Choice of forum and choice of law clauses in international commercial 
agreements” 1978 International Trade Law Journal 311 334. 
 
Legislation 
56. Magistrate’s Court Act. 32 of 1994. 
 
Magazines and newspapers 
57. Without Prejudice (12-2012). 
 
Reports 
58. Report No. C59/1 on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters, 27 September 1968. 
 
29 
 
South African case law 
59. American Flag plc v Great African T-shirt Corporation 2000 1 SA 356 (W). 
60. Creutzburg v Commercial Bank of Namibia Ltd 2006 4 All SA 327 (SCA). 
61. Ex Parte Spinazze 1985 3 SA 650 (A). 
62. Hay Management Consultations Ltd v P3 Management Consultations (Pty) Ltd 2005 2 SA 
522 (SCA). 
63. Foize Africa (Pty) Ltd v Foize Beheer BV 2012 4 All SA 387 (SCA). 
64. Mediterranean Shipping Co v Speedwell Shipping Co Ltd 1986 4 SA 329 (D). 
65. Veneta Mineraria Spa v Carolina Collieries (Pty) Ltd 1987 4 SA 883 (A). 
66. Travelex Limited v Maloney 2016 ZASCA 218.  
67. University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services; 
Association of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic; 
Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic  2016 6 SA 596 
(CC). 
68. Veneta Mineraria Spa v Carolina Collieries 1987 2 All SA 447 (A).  
